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A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING MODEL
FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS
Franklin R. Shupp *

IT

becomesimmediatelyapparentin analyz-

ing any national economy that some resources are scarce not only in the economic
sense, but also in the more popular interpretation of that word. Because of international
trade these shortages frequently impose no
great hardship on the "have not" nation; for
example, the absence of tea and coffee plantations in the United States does not prevent
Americans from consuming prodigious quantities of these beverages. However, in the event
of an hostility these resource scarcities can
create a serious problem, especially if they
happen to include some of the so-called strategic materials. It is with these materials,
which are both vital to the country's defense
and in short domestic supply, that this paper
is concerned.
Some of the more publicized scarce resources which have been regarded as critical by
the United States include: tin, uranium, manganese, rubber, quinine, diamonds, and possibly plants manufacturing heavy machinery
and precision instruments.' The very heterogeneity of this group augurs strongly against
finding a single solution or even a unique mode
of attack to the problem of how best to assure
an adequate supply of these resources under all
political conditions. Nevertheless, while the
details of any possible solution may vary enormously with the individual material, almost
without exception the available policy measures
can be fitted into one of the following categories:
* This research was undertaken while the author was
associated with the Princeton Econometric Research Program and supported by a contract with the Office of Naval
Research Nonr-1858 (02). The author benefited greatly
from the criticisms and suggestions of Oskar Morgenstern,
Harlan Mills, Stuart Dreyfus, Herman Karreman, and
other members of the Program. All errors are the author's
responsibility.
1These last two items are included because subsidies in
the forms of high protective tariffs, quotas, and government contracts at bids substantially in excess of foreign
offers have been granted on precisely these grounds, i.e.,
their strategic importance.
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Importation under all conditions
Subsidized domestic production and research
Stockpiling
Conservation
Substitution

These classes of policy measures are generally regarded as alternatives, but only infrequently is one pursued to the exclusion of the
others. Generally, a considerable degree of
interdependence exists among alternative
measures and occasionally even among the
various strategic materials themselves. Furthermore, within each category a large number
of decisions must also be made before a policy
can be formulated. For example, should a convoy with destroyer escort be employed or
should an airlift be used? What is the optimal
size of the stockpile? Do we invest in butene
or butydiene rubber or both?
Both the interdependence and the complexity of the strategic materials problem suggest
that some tools of operations research might
prove useful in its analysis. However, the uncertainty in the political forecasts so dominates the problem that it virtually precludes the
use of "linear" programming, especially if a
quadratic objective function is also necessary.
Nor is the problem amenable to analysis by
game theory, since the major objective of any
potential aggressor would be to win the war not
merely to disrupt the flow of strategic materials.2 On the other hand, if one is willing to
accept a modicum of aggregation, dynamic
programming can be applied quite effectively,
and it is a model using this technique which is
presented here.
2 This should not be construed to mean that the potential antagonist may not try to impede critical material flows
as part of his over-all objective of winning the battle. On
the other hand, if the stockpiled material is a potentially
effective deterrent, e.g., hydrogen bombs, the whole complexion of the problem changes. The object then is to
prevent an hostility, not to insure access to strategic materials. This new problem is beyond the scope of this paper,
and perhaps is not at all amenable to any sort of quantitative analysis since it involves evaluating the cost of a war.

A PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS
In order to both facilitate the exposition and
to give some specificity to the argument a single
mineral, manganese, is used to illustrate the
model. Manganese qualifies as a strategic material since it is (1) in short domestic supply
and (2) is vital in any war effort. With regards
to the first criterion it is sufficient to observe
that during the last decade despite the stimulus
provided by huge government subsidies, U.S.
production of commercial grade manganese ore
averaged only 10 per cent of the annual consumption of roughly 2,000,000 tons. On the
second count we note that manganese is an
indispensable ingredient in the steel making
process, where it is added in the form of a ferro
or silico manganese alloy to impart both hardness and ductility to the finished steel.
As implied earlier there is no strategic materials problem unless some hostility either
exists or is expected with some positive probability within the planning horizon. Fortunately, this does not necessitate a detailed forecast of the complex political milieu of the world
for the planning period. Only those movements
which cause significant changes in the demand
for and the nondomestic supply of the strategic
material under study need be forecast. In the
case of manganese, the demand is a derived one
and is contingent on the level of steel production which in turn fluctuates with the prevailing political climate.3 Three possible political
states, peace, cold war, and hot war, are here
considered to have significant effects on the
level of steel production and therefore on manganese demand. The supply side of the problem can be summarizedby observing the existence of only four manganese producing regions.
These are: U.S.S.R., India, West Africa, and
South America. The accessibility of these ores
to the United States in any year yields the
supply constraint for manganese. Like the
demand function, this is also dependent on the
prevailing political situation.
In the next section the political forecast and
the five policy measures as they impinge on
the manganese situation are outlined in some
s Although steel production also fluctuates with the
general level of business activity, no provision for these
fluctuations is made in our model. However, since only
sizable discrete variations in demand are permitted in the
model, the above restriction is not too severe.

91

detail. In the following section a model embracing the main characteristics of the problem
is constructed, and in the concluding section
results of the model are analyzed.
I. The ManganeseProblem
As indicated above the supply of and the
demand for manganese are related to the prevailing political conditions, and therefore, a
forecast of these conditions for the entire planning horizon is essential. The length of this
planning horizon has been arbitrarily chosen
as ten years. We assume that only three possible levels of hostility, i) peace, ii) cold war,
iii) hot war,4 determine the demand, and four
possible sources of manganese ore, a) U.S.S.R.,
India, West Africa, and South America, b) all
except Russia, c) West Africa and South America, d) South America, yield the supply constraints. From these twelve demand-supply
combinations are obtained; some of these sets
are clearly impossible, for example (i-d), while
others are extremely improbable, for example,
(iii-a). Eliminating pairs in this manner reduces the number of feasible political states
from twelve to five. These five sets are given
in Table 1.
TABLE

1. -DEMAND

AND SUPPLY CONSTRAINTS
FOR MANGANESE ORE

(Net tons manganese metal)
Political States
Yi
Y2

i-a
ii-b

Y3

ii-c

Y4

iii-b
iii-d

Ys

Demand

Supply Constraints

800,000
1,000,000

1,600,000
1,200,000

1,000,000

800,000

1,200,000
1,200,000

1,200,000
600,000

The forecast of these five states for each year
of the planning horizon given by the probabili-

ty vectorS

=

{S1,

S2,
S3,

S4,

s5} determines both

the demand for and nondomestic availability of
manganese. The strategic materials problem
consists of meeting these demands from current
4The hot war assumed here is one of attrition. Other
types of war negate the whole concept of strategic materials. The assumption does not imply that an all out
hydrogen bomb war is impossible or even unlikely; only
that in that event any strategic materials policy for manganese is useless. Paradoxical as it may seem, a quick hydrogen war is quite similar to peace from the strategic materials
viewpoint.
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nondomestic supplies and from other sources
at the minimumcost consistent with the welfare
of friendly nations. Before discussing these
other sources let us consider some possible
methods of introducing the political forecast.
Three methods are discussed in this paper and
these are somewhat arbitrarily labeled deterministic,

Markovian,

and

"tree

forecast."

Since we shall be concerned with the varying
conclusions resulting from using each of these
three techniques, a paragraph describing each
seems in order.
All of these forecasts mechanisms can be
implementedby introducing a transition matrix
Q whose elements are transition probabilities
defined as:
qij(t) = P(yj(t+l) IYi(t))

i.e., if state yi prevails in year t, then the probability that state yj will prevail in year t + 1
is equal to

qij(t).

If these transitions probabili-

ties are time independent, as in our Markovian
forecast, then the subscript t is usually dropped.
It follows then from the definition that
St+1 = QSt.

In the deterministic case we assume that the
prevailing political states, yi's, are known with
certainty for each of the years in the planning
horizon. (This need not imply clairvoyance
since this "certainty" can be interpreted as
either the most likely political situation or a
weighted mean of a probabilistic forecast.)
Certainty dictates that in each period only one
of the elements of the probability vector S is
positive (and equal to 1); this can be achieved
for succeeding periods by introducing only one
positive element in the transition matrix Q.
The position of this unit element will vary over
time in order to introduce in proper sequence
each of the political states of the forecast. The
deterministic forecast used in this study is
shown by the solid line in Chart 1.
The transition matrix for the Markovian case
is time independent and is given by the following matrix which very roughly characterizesthe
situation of the last fifty years.
.7
1.1
Q= 1.1
1.4
1.5

.2
.6
.2
0
0

.1
.2
.4
0
0

0
.1
.1
.4
.2

O?
O?
.2
.2
.31

The matrix is completely ergodic and converges to an S vector, {.39, .28, .16, .10, .07}.
These are the steady state probabilities for the
respective political states {Yi, Y2,

Y3, Y4, Y5}.

Since it seemed unrealistic to assume that the
prevailing political climate was not known with
certainty for the initial period, state Y2 was
selected as the initial prevailing state for all
computations. As a consequence instead of
having steady-state properties throughout the
planning horizon, the forecast exhibited transient behavior during the first five periods, after
which nearly complete convergence obtained.
The "tree forecast" is a modified branch
analysis similar to that shown in Chart 1, and
requires that the transition matrix change from
period to period. Furthermore, if the continuity of each projection (branch) is to be preserved, expansion of the matrix is necessary
during those three periods when two or more
projections meet, e.g., period 3. Alternatively,
if continuity is not felt to be important a 5 x 5
transition matrix suffices.5
The forecast in Chart 1 has some interesting
properties. Projection E not only is the most
likely path, but it is also the weighted mean of
all five paths.6 It is this projection that is used
for the deterministic forecast. Also over the
ten year planning horizon, the average time
in each of the five states is approximatelyequal
to that obtained in the Markovian forecast with
an initial political situation given by Y2.
We must still explore the available alternative policy measures before we can begin to
construct a model. The first of these, which
we have called "import under all conditions,"
is generally the most economical in either peace
time or for a short hydrogen war. Under other
political conditions it may not only be very
expensive, but even impossible since severe
limitations may be placed on the quantity of
ore than can be imported. For example, it has
been estimated that losses due to German submarine activity in World War II increased the
5 Since a computer of very limited memory capacity was
used for these calculations, this latter procedure was followed.
'Due to the limited number of possible political states
the strange bunching during period 5 and 6 was necessitated
if the mean path was also to be the modal path. This is a
desirable characteristic for subsequent analysis.
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CHART 1. -POSSIBLE

93

POLITICAL PROJECTIONS AND THEIR PROBABILITIES
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price of manganese ore by tenfold.7 Also prior
to 1950 as much as 50 per cent of all manganese imports came from the U.S.S.R.; today
none does. It follows immediately then that
both the costs of and the constraints imposed
on this alternative are largely a function of the
prevailing political climate.
Subsidized domestic production is another
possible policy which has been employed with
mixed success. A 100 per cent import duty
promulgated in 1922 did succeed in increasing
domestic production to 17 per cent of consumption in 1925, but only one year later with the
protective tariff still intact production reverted
to 7 per cent. More recently the government
has paid domestic producers two to three times
the import price for ores to be stockpiled. Even
these guaranteed high prices failed to raise
domestic production above 15 per cent of current consumption. At the same time these
policies virtually depleted all high grade ore
reserves in the United States. Federally financed research projects to develop methods
for beneficiating low grade domestic ores have
been inore successful. Several processes have
proven to be technologically feasible in prototype sized plants, but none are competitive with
imported ores.
Stockpiling needs little elaboration. The
C. B. Larson, internal paper, General Services Administration.

U.S. government has stockpiled approximately
6,000,000 tons of high grade foreign ore (a
three-year supply) costing over $250,000,000
and some 1,750,000 tons of assorted quality
domestic ores costing close to $100,000,000.
The bulk of this stockpile was accumulated in
the early 1950's during which time the c.i.f.
Eastern Seaboard price increased more than
50 per cent.
A fourth policy to be considered is the substitution of manganese by some other material(s). The addition of manganese alloys in
steel manufacturingaccounts for approximately
97 per cent of all manganese consumed, and no
other known alloy can impart both hardness
and ductility to steel and at the same time
serve as a scavenger to combine with sulphur.
Titanium and molybdenum have been considered but neither do both jobs effectively. Furthermore, the supply of these metals is almost
microscopic in relation to the quantities needed
for this purpose, and they cost five to ten times
as much as manganese alloys. Also during an
emergency there exists a tendency to substitute
manganese itself for nickel and chrome yielding
on balance a zero or possible negative substitution.
The final category, conservation, is primarily a function of changes in steel practices and
steel specifications. A thorough investigation
by the American Iron and Steel Institute in
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1949 indicated that savings of more than 5
system is prescribed by the endogenous state
variable x (e.g., the level of the stockpile) and
per cent in either of these areas could not be
the exogenous state variable yi (e.g., the prerealistically anticipated.8 During the Korean
vailing political climate).
conflict most steel makers implemented a proR (x,yi,p) = the cost in period n - 1 of purgram of increased ladle additions of alloy
suing a particular policy p from a finite set of
(cutting back furnace additions) to conserve
feasible policies P given the system described
manganese. This proved effective and the conby (x,yi).
tinuance of this program virtually precludes
xp' = the resulting state of the system at the bethe possibility of further significant reductions.
ginning of period n given that policy p was
A technique for reclaiming manganese from
employed in period n - 1.
steel slags has also been developed, but has
The above equation can be solved for all
proven uneconomical. Finally, it is quite unlikely that appreciable changes in steel specifi- combinations of the set of permissable values
cations will be made by the Department of of x and y in the period N - 1, and then iteratively until the first period of the planning
Defense in time of an emergency.
horizon is reached.9 The necessity of a numerical approach as opposed to the analytic techII. The Model
niques of the Arrow-Harris-Marschakmodel 10
The manganese problem outlined in the pre- and its variants, is imposed by the complexity
ceding section can be incorporated in a dy- of the manganese problem. More specifically
namic programmingmodel, the objective func- as can be seen in the succeeding model we note
tion of which minimizes the cost of securing that:
adequate quantities of manganese to meet in1. There is more than one endogenous state
dustrial demands. Essential to this model is a variable, x, and furthermore one of these inrecursive relationship which utilizes the Mar- volves both nonrecurring capital investment
kovian-like property that an optimal decision costs and a time lag. Time lags are normally
for a given state of the system is independent handled by backlogging orders but this is ruinof how that state was reached. The state of the ous in a war situation.
system itself can be characterized by one or
2. The set of feasible policies P is determined
more state variables, the level of which is by five unrelated constraints which could not
usually influenced by activities in preceding be incorporatedinto a single criterion function.
periods, but which can be autonomously given.
3. The demand forecast is not visualized as
It is this latter type of state variable that is being time invariant. This is partially a conused to introduce the uncertain political fore- sequence of the necessarily short planning
cast into our model.
horizon.
The functional equation which illustrates
The complete manganese model can be writboth the recursive relationship of the cost func- ten in functional equation form as:11
tion and the technique for incorporating a
= Min[ 1.OOz,+ ci (zc + zs)
fn (Xs,Xr,Xd,y)
probabilistic forecast is given by:
fn-1(x,yJ)

=Min
[R(x,yj,p)
pep

5
+

, 1qij fn(xp',yj)

Assuming that the planning horizon has N
periods then:
fh-

(X,yi)

=

total expected cost from the begin-

ningof periodn - 1 to the end of the planning
horizon given that the current state of the
8American Iron and Steel Institute, Problems Involved
in the Conservation of Manganese (New York, 1949), 5.

+ 21.54zd + (24.00 + 24.60z,) zc
+ 59.14Axd + 8 X {qij fn+1(x8
j=1
+ Zs

-

Zs, Xr

-

Zd, Xd +

AXd,

Yj) }

9 An authoritative discussion of the computational aspects of dynamic programming can be found in R. Bellman
[1], 85-90.
10 Kenneth Arrow, Theodore Harris, and Jacob Marshak
"Optimal Inventory Policy," Econometrica, 19 (July 1951),
250-272.
" All costs are given in millions of dollars and each unit
of x or z corresponds to the equivalent of 200,000 net tons
of manganese metal.
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for i - (1,2,
subject to
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surance premium is included. Since insurance
is generally limited to the cargo (and not the
ship) these costs contain a downward bias.
?
Zs Xs
Zd
min [Xd,Xr]
Both the domestic production operating costs
zC + Zs </3
(21.54) and capital costs (59.14) are based on
Z, +
Z8 +
an engineering study 14 of the Dean-Leute
Zd + Zc ?
beneficiation
process, which has been developed
ci z. + 59.14 Axd? 125 12
in
a
prototype
size operation. The cost of ore
where
withdrawn
from
the stockpile (1.00) is largex8 = 0, 1, . . . 15 = level of stockpile
a
ly
transportation
charge estimated by the
xr = 0, 1, . . . 40 = size of domestic reserves 13
late
J.
H.
Crickett,
while
the penalty charges
Xd=
0, 1, . . . 4 = capacity of domestic bene(24.00
+
are
estimated
costs of con24.60z,)
ficiating facilities, Axd ? 0
servation and substitution practices. The
yi for i = (1, . . . 5) = prevailing political state
zc = o, 1 . . . = quantity of manganese im- strongly positive quadratic cost reflects the
limited quantities of ores which can be obtained
ported for consumption
Zs= 0, 1 . . .
quantity of manganese im- by either of these two methods.
By properly manipulating the transition
ported for stockpiling
0, 1 . . . = quantity of manganese with- probability parameters each of the three types
z8drawn from stockpile
of forecasts (deterministic, Markovian, and
z0 = , 1 . . . = quantity of manganese pro- "tree forecast") can be achieved. Using this
duced domestically
model, optimal policies have been computed
Zc- 0, 1 . . . = quantity of manganese deficit
for each of the three forecast approaches, and
(obtained via conservation and substitution the results are indicated in the succeeding
techniques)
section.
=
qij

. .

5)

transition probabilities

8 = discount factor

import constraint given state i (Values
given in Table 1)
yi demand given state i (Values given in Table
1)
Cii import cost given the prevailing political
situation, yi
cii = 18.65 + 1.51zx
17.65 + 1.76zi
C2=
pi

Ci3 =

15.67+ 2.88zx

= 28.09 + 1.76zx
cZ5 = 37.41 + 9.00zi
c

A few comments on these and other costs
may be in order. The import costs have been
calculated from time series data of f.o.b. prices
for each of the four major producing regions
over the period 1947-1957. These data were
deflated and a simple regression run to obtain
the price elasticity. For states y4 and y5 during
which an hostility is indicated, a war risk in12 In the actual computations the
first term in this constraint was eliminated. The assumption being that while
Congress might limit annual funds for producing high cost
beneficiating facilities, they would be freer with funds to
purchase stockpiled goods which might later be resold.
Obviously the model could be solved as written.
"3Since in this instance this constraint is never binding
it was eliminated from the computations thus reducing the
dimensionality of the problem to 400 = (16 X 5 X 5).

III.General Characteristics
of the Solution
Using the deterministic forecasting technique, optimal policies for each of the five
paths (A, B, C, D, E) of Chart 1 were calculated, and as anticipated substantial differences
in the level of activities (z), state variables
(x), and costs obtained for the various forecasts. To find a single best policy for all five
paths, the payoff matrix given in Table 2 was
constructed using the optimal policies for each
of these forecasts as strategies and each forecast as a possible event. The events (forecasts)
were assigned probabilities equal to those
shown in Chart 1.
Of the five possible policies the C optimal
policy yielded the minimum expected cost
while the B optimal policy would be selected if
the maximum criterion were employed. Both
of these policies differ widely with respect to
the level of domestic processing facilities constructed and/or the size of the stockpile to be
accumulated from those values given by the E
optimal policy (that of the weighted mean
" Singmaster and Breyer, An Appraisal of Processes for
Recovery of Manganese From Basic Open Hearth Slags
(New York, 1955).
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TABLE 2. -PAYOFF
MATRIX FOR FIvE
SELECTED STRATEGIES a

Strategies

A Optimal
Policy
B Optimal
Policy
C Optimal
Policy
D Optimal
Policy
E Optimal
Policy
a

Events and Their Probabilities
Forecast
Forecast
Forecast

Forecast

Forecast

A

B

C

1,148.7

1,507.1

1,300.5

1,573.3

1,194.0

1,277.9

1,238.9

1,290.3

1,350.9

1,238.4

1,260.0

1,380.3

1,131.5

1,389.4

1,185.8

1,254.4

1,455.3

1,220.1

1,269.3

1,185.8

1,191.9

1,531.5

1,211.3

1,355.8

1,075.6

Costs are in millions

D

E

of dollars.

path). These differences are shown in Table
3 and clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of
using a weighted mean forecast.15
Although the C optimal policy yields the
minimum expected cost of those five strategies
considered, it may not be the best possible
policy for the uncertain future given by Chart

But, given the uncertain political forecast
which confronts us, we would expect that a
more flexible policy (strategy), in which the
decision is based on new information acquired
as the political future unfolds, would result in
a lower expected cost.
This second point forces us to distinguish
between an optimal policy under certainty and
one under uncertainty. In the former case an
optimal policy consists of a single sequence of
decisions, while in the latter case it consists of
a large numberof possible alternative sequences
of decisions, which indicate for each period
what decisions are to be made once the current
prevailing political situation is known. This is
shown in Table 4 which indicates the optimal
TABLE 4. -

Policy (Activity Level)a

Period
and

Change In
State Variable

Weighted
Mean Forecast
(E optimal)

Increase in
Stockpile Level
lst year
0
2nd year
0
Domestic Beneficiating
Capacity Built
1st year
200,000
2nd year
0
Expected
Cost $1,232,000,000
a

Maximin
(Wald)
(B optimal)

V
C

1-Y2
2-yi

10
4
6
6
8
6

2-y3

0
0

400,000
0

$1,228,000,000

$1,263,000,000

metal

2-y4

2-y5

an

1:

0
4
4
4
4
4

-

a

CI

0
0
0
0
0
2

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
2
0
0

u
E

Expected
Cost b

4
0
0
0
0
0

1123
791
875
924
977
1055

a Values are in 100,000 net tons manganese metal contained in
ore, and millions of dollars.
b Costs are in millions of dollars.

400,000
0

Values are net tons of manganese

E

State

2-Y2

0
400,000

~~
~~0

0

TABLE 3.COMPARISON OF POLICIES USING
DIFFERENT DECISION CRITERIA
Best Policies a
Expected Cost
(Bayes)
(C optimal)

OPTIMAL POLICIES AND EXPECTED COSTS
FOR THE MARKOVIAN FORECAST

content.

1 for two reasons. First, since there are literally thousands of other possible strategies it is
quite possible that a number of these would be
less costly than the C optimal policy. Secondly,
since each of the five strategies is an optimal
policy for a deterministic forecast, it consists
of a single sequence of decisions to be pursued
irrespective of the prevailing political climate."6
15 In fact, because
the weighted mean forecast is also
the most likely forecast, the difference between the expected
costs of the C and E optimal policies is only $4,000,000.
16 Obvious modifications of these decisions were permitted in our calculations. E. g., if optimal policy A calls
for importing more ore than forecast C requires for con-

policy for the first two of eleven periods using
the Markovian forecast approach and the
transition matrix given in Section I.
Since the political climate in period 1 is
assumed to be known with certainty, a single
set of decisions for that period suffices. However, since an uncertain period 2 is postulated,
a different set of decisions is indicated for each
prevailing state in that period. Table 5 presents the results obtained by using the "tree
forecast" mechanism outlined in Section I. It
differs from the results of the Markovian technique since two periods are assumed to be
known with certainty. Note also that a small
sumption, the excess can be transferred to the stockpile.
Conversely, if consumption demands exceeds imports and
domestic production, stockpile withdrawals are permitted.

A PROGRAMMING MODEL FOR STRATEGIC MATERIALS
TABLE 5.

OPTIMAL POLICIES AND EXPECTED COSTS
FOR THE 'TREE FORECAST"
Policy (Activity Levels)

a
>s

Cd

o 0.

Period
and

State

~

U

o
414

a

X

5

0' 4
CZi:

a

a
o

uV

X Q

Expected
Costs b

1162
924.2
704.6

1-Ya
2-y2
3-yr

10
6
2

0
4
4

0
0
0

0
0
2

0
2
0

4
0
0

3-Y2
3-y3
3-y4

4
6
6

4
4
4

0
0
0

2
0
2

0
2
0

0
4
0

768.3
945.5
863.3

a Values are in 100,000 net tons manganese metal contained in
ore, and millions of dollars.
b Costs are in millions of dollars.

stockpile (200,000 net tons) is accumulated in
this second period.
Since the "tree" forecasting technique yields
a political forecast almost identical to that
given in Chart 1, (and therefore, also to that
of our payoff matrix), it is interesting to compare the above costs and policies with those
indicated by the Bayes criterion in Table 3.
During the first two periods, the two policies
are similar except for the smaller stockpile
accumulation in the "tree forecast" policy.
However, an expected savings of $66,000,000
is obtained by pursuing the more flexible stochastic ("tree") policy.
The numerical approach used in the preceding computations spews out considerable
quantities of data similar to that shown in
Table 6. Simple decision rules can be easily
derived by noting that movement across a row
indicates the imputed value of a stockpile and
down a column the imputed value of domestic
beneficiation capacity.
Suppose, for example, we are in state Y2
with no stockpile and no beneficiating capacity.
In this situation the imputed value of a 400,000
net ton stockpile is $1123 - $1063 or $60 (million). Likewise the imputed value of a 400,000
net ton capacity beneficiating plant equals
$1123 - $975 or $148 (million). If the marginal cost of acquiring a 400,000 net tons of
manganese is less than $60,000,000 a stockpile
of this size should be accumulated, and if a
plant with 400,000 net ton capacity can be
constructed for less than $148,000,000 it should
be built.
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Using the proper coefficients from our model
(Ci2)

and notingthat manganesefor stockpiling

is purchased after ore for consumption, the
marginal cost is calculated at $77,540,000.
Since this exceeds $60,000,000 this quantity of
manganese should not be stockpiled. Likewise,
we can calculate the capital cost of constructing a 400,000 net ton capacity plant, which is
2(59.14) = $118,280,000. Since this is less
than $148,000,000 the plant should be built.
(These results are consistent with those given
in the first row of Table 4.)
If we always think in terms of a ten year
planning horizon, similar decision rules can be
TABLE 6. - SELECTED COST DATA a FROM THE PRINT
OUT SHEET OF THE MARKOVIAN FORECAST MODEL

(Millions of dollars)
Domestic
Level of Stockpile
Capacity
(100,000 net tons manganesemetal as ore)
Political (100,000 net tons
4
12
8
16
20
Situation manganese metal) 0
Yi

0
4

8

832

803

781

768

764 765

Y2

0

1123

1063

1006

949

894

4
8

975
900

919
859

866
821

Y3

0
4

1200
1019

1106
950

1036
885

8

914

864

826

y4

0
4
8

1209
1091
961

1178
1010
894

1097
935
838

1022
867
802

953
804
781

890
747
771

Ya

0
4
8

1522
1178
986

1265
1036
884

1122
933
829

1020
853
796

940
789
777

873
734
769

1012
877

956
829

903
783

853
740

802
699

753
661
842

817 770 726
793 776 770
972 913 855
828 777 729
795 777 770

a Values are the expected costs of pursuing an optimal policy over
the entire ten year planning horizon given the initial state variables
indicated by the positon of the cost figure in the table.

derived merely by noting our current location
in Table 6 and proceeding as above. A somewhat more complicated method for deriving
decision rules must be employed when the results of the "tree forecast" model are used. In
this event, the current period is just as important as the level of the current state variables,
since the transition probabilities are not assumed to be time invariant. Consequently, a
new table for each period is necessary.
The emphasis in this paper has been on the
techniques employed and very little has been
said concerning policy implications. This is as
it should be since all results are based on a
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hypothetical forecast of the political future.
Furthermore, the model did not take into account such factors as start-up troubles, which
frequently plague a new operation such as the
domestic beneficiation process. Nevertheless,
it seems reasonable to infer that the government stockpile of both domestic and foreign
ores containing almost 3,500,000 net tons of
manganese metal greatly exceeds those levels
which could be justified on purely economic
grounds, since the largest stockpile indicated
by any of our stochastic forecasts is 400,000
net tons and even the most pessimistic deterministic forecast (projection B) calls for a

maximum stockpile of 1,200,000 net tons of
metal.
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